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 This paper analyzes the relationship between refugee populations per capita and terrorism 
incidents per capita in a host country. Using data from UNHCR and the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD), I conduct cross-national time series poisson and OLS analyses for 164 
countries during the years 1992-2013 to explain their relationship. I then control for regional 
refugee origins to determine if certain refugee populations are more likely to influence terrorism. 
Finally, I analyze additional variables, including internally displaced persons (IDP) populations, 
the post-9/11 period, and lagged military spending. Previous literature (Choi and Salehyan, 2013; 
Choi and Piazza, 2016) has examined models that analyze the relationship between terrorism and 
refugees or terrorism and internally displaced persons, however, no paper has examined models 
including both migration populations. Using the existing literature, I add relevant variables to 
established models to better understand the relationship. The results show that when refugee 
populations are included in the models, the additional explanatory variables, in particular, 
internally displaced person populations, may help explain the effects of refugee populations in 
previous studies. 
Introduction 
 This paper examines the effects of refugee populations per capita on the number of 
terrorism incidents per capita within host countries and whether certain characteristics of host 
countries influence the relationship between refugees and terrorism. I use models presented in 
Choi and Salehyans’ “No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and 
Terrorism” (2013) and Randahl’s “Refugees and Terrorism” (2016) as a baseline for measuring 
the effects of refugees on terrorism incidents. I add variables for internally displaced persons per 
capita, autocracy, domestic and neighboring war and conflict, and military spending to the Choi 
and Salehyan models while adding IDPs per capita, a post-9/11 dummy variable, military 
spending, and state failure variables to Randahl’s models. I also examine the effects of refugees 
from different regions to determine if region of origin has any significance on terrorism incidents 
within a host country. Previous literature (Choi and Piazza, 2016) has shown positive and 
significant relationships between IDPs and terrorism, while shifting policies and focus may have 
an effect on terrorism in the post-9/11 period. War, conflict, and state failure create spillover 
effects including generating refugee and IDP populations while military spending may be used to 
combat terrorism within a host country. The models used in this paper result in similar findings 
to the previous models. Choi and Salehyans’ models show positive and significant relationships 
between refugee populations per capita while Randahl’s models show no significant 
relationships. The additional variables however, in particular IDP populations, demonstrate 
significant relationships.  
 Refugee populations have become a widely-discussed topic in today’s geo-political 
climate. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there were 65.1 
million forcibly displaced people, with 21.3 million refugees, worldwide (UNHCR). Wars in 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and Syria have resulted in 53% of refugee origins and have brought the 
consequences of refugee and internally displaced populations to the forefront of the political 
atmosphere (UNHCR).  From security concerns to humanitarian efforts, the implications of 
refugee crises are significant. Host countries must take the social, economic, and political 
impacts into consideration when deciding how to deal with a large influx of refugees. In Europe, 
there is some evidence that large refugee populations have put a strain on host countries. 
Germany, since the start of the Syrian civil war, has accepted over 200,000 refugees from Syria, 
along with hundreds of thousands from other countries (UNHCR). This has led to numerous 
reports of culture-clash between the refugees and citizens of the host countries. The 2015 Paris 
attacks, amongst other incidents, have sparked debate about the security of borders and whether 
or not these large refugee populations give rise to terrorism (Bigo et al, 2015).  
One theory argues that this culture clash can result in refugee populations feeling 
alienated and their way of life challenged resulting in disdain for the host country. This in turn 
results in the radicalization of individuals who then commit terrorist attacks (Sude et al, 2015; 
Post and Sheffer, 2007). While plausible, it should be noted that the majority of refugee 
populations are taken in by neighboring countries, where cultures are likely to be similar. For 
example, Turkey (2,733,655 refugees), Lebanon (1,033,513 refugees) and Jordan (656,400 
refugees) share a border with Syria and account for the vast majority of Syrian refugees 
accepted. Another theory is that terrorist groups use these large migrations as opportunities to 
slip through the cracks and enter countries with the intent of committing terrorist acts within the 
host countries (Adamson, 2009). With such large movements of people, many coming from war-
torn regions, entering a country, it may be difficult for the appropriate agencies to perform 
thorough and complete background checks on individuals and to monitor their activities within 
the country. Lastly, the hypothesis presented by Choi and Salehyan argues that the presence of 
refugee populations, and the aid workers they draw, provide “militant groups with opportunities 
for looting and for attacking foreign targets” stating that “aid supplies have often been subject to 
looting by militant actors” and “foreign aid workers provide easy targets for terrorists who adopt 
anti-western ideologies.” (pp. 53, 68). 
 This paper looks to expand upon previous studies analyzing the relationship between 
refugees and terrorism. By following the previous methods used by Choi and Salehyan and 
including additional variables in their models, this paper aims to help provide a clearer picture 
into what may or may not influence the number of terrorism incidents within a country. This is a 
complex, global issue that requires an extensive amount of research to be done in order to better 
understand this relationship.  
Literature Review 
 The post 9/11 period has seen an increase in academic literature analyzing the 
relationship between migration and security. Migration, the forced migration of refugees, and its 
links to political violence has been studied extensively. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) examined 
the relationship between refugees from neighboring countries and civil war, where they find 
“refugee flows are one of the mechanisms driving the observed diffusion or spillover of civil 
conflict [within host countries].” (p. 360). Salehyan (2008) also finds that “both refugee-sending 
and refugee-receiving states are more likely to initiate militarized disputes.” (p. 798). Bove and 
Bӧhmelt (2016) examine the relationship between immigration and terrorism and find 
“immigrants are an important vehicle for the diffusion of terrorism from one country to another. 
At the same time, however, controlling for a series of unit-level variables, fixed effects, and 
other influences, our results emphasize that immigration per se is unlikely to affect terrorism.” 
(p. 584). 
 Despite these findings, there remains little literature examining the relationship between 
refugees and terrorism. Ekey (2008) analyzed the effect of refugee populations in a host country 
and the number of terrorism incidents committed by terrorist groups originating within the host 
country. She found “an increase in the number of refugees a country hosts leads to an increase in 
the activities of terrorist groups based in that country.” (p. 27). Milton et al (2013) find that 
refugees increase transnational terrorism arguing that refugees often find themselves living in 
poor conditions and treated poorly within host countries. These conditions can lead to increases 
in transnational terrorism in host countries. Similarly, Choi and Salehyan (2013) examined the 
link between refugees and terrorism and find that “countries with many refugees are more likely 
to experience both domestic and international terrorism,” (p. 53) arguing that refugees and 
humanitarian workers are more likely to be targeted in terrorist attacks. In contrast to Choi and 
Salehyans’ findings, Randahl’s (2016) results show “no support at all for the hypothesis that 
refugees would cause an increase in either the incidence or magnitude of terrorism in their host 
countries.” (p. 51). He argues that by not including conflict and war within a country or within 
neighboring countries, their impact may be included in refugee populations’ impact on terrorism 
within a host country, as conflict causes both large refugee populations and terrorism incidents. 
Choi and Powers (2010) find “although military interventions may increase transnational 
terrorism by creating target-rich environments for these attacks, by prompting individuals to 
utilize this tactic for the defense of their homeland, or for grievance-based reasons, the ability of 
individuals to utilize terrorism during interventions may ultimately depend on the intensity of the 
intervention in question.” (pp. 28-29) while Salehyan (2008) writes “Domestic strife and civil 
war frequently produce large population dislocations and refugee flows across national 
boundaries.” (p. 787). 
 These differences in findings could be a result of several factors. Different time frames or 
methodologies could result in these variations. For example, Choi and Salehyan analyze the 
relationship between refugees and terrorism using negative binomial regressions with data for 
157 countries from 1970-2007 while Randahl uses OLS regressions with fixed effects for 161 
countries from 2002-2012. Another possible explanation for the differences could be a result of 
missing relevant variables that help describe the relationship between refugees and terrorism. To 
investigate these differences, I follow both methodologies used by Choi and Salehyan and 
Randahl. I use their established models to attempt to analyze the relationship between refugees 
and terrorism by adding several variables to each model. 
Methodology 
 This paper follows the methodology established by Choi and Salehyan (2013) and 
Randahl (2016). I then add additional explanatory variables to help better understand the 
relationship between refugees and terrorism incidents in host countries. Choi and Salehyan use 
terrorism data from the GTD while refugee data comes from the World Refugee Survey (this 
paper uses refugee data from UNHCR). The dependent variables for the models this paper looks 
to analyze include terrorism incidents per capita and casualties per capita that result from 
terrorism within a host country. The authors use total counts for their models and, as a result, 
encounter overdispersion and therefore run negative binomial regressions for their models. 
Converting the variables to per capita measures eliminates this overdispersion and therefore I run 
cross-national time series poisson regressions with fixed effects for country and year and 
standard errors clustered by country to compare and contrast the results from different time-
frames. I then add additional variables to control for IDP populations per capita within a country, 
whether or not conflict or war is occurring within a neighboring country, an autocratic dummy 
variable, military spending of the host country, and the post 9/11 dummy variable that replaces 
the post Cold War variable. 
 Next I use the model and variables proposed by Randahl, who uses data from 2002-2012 
for 161 countries. Randahl’s paper also uses data from the GTD but uses refugee data from 
UNHCR. Randahl creates dependent variables using the number of attacks and casualties per 
million inhabitants. Randahl also creates a variable for refugee populations within host countries, 
using a number of refugees per 1000 inhabitants variable. This paper however uses the terrorism 
incidents per capita and casualties per capita variables. Next I compare and contrast the 
differences in time-frames using cross-country time series OLS regressions with fixed effects for 
country and year with standard errors clustered by country. I then add variables for IDP 
population per capita, the state-failure variable proposed by Choi and Salehyan, military 
spending, and the post-9/11 variable.  
Data 
 The data for terrorism incidents and casualties (total wounded and killed) comes from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), a dataset compiled by the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, which 
contains information for over 150,000 terrorism incidents worldwide from 1970-2015. The GTD 
(June 2015) defines terrorism incidents as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence by a non-state actor to attain political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation.”. In addition to this definition, the GTD excludes attacks “outside the 
context of legitimate warfare activities.” (pp. 8-9). The GTD codes such incidents as 1 for 
doubtful and 0 otherwise. In response to this definition, I exclude incidents coded as doubtful. 
While the GTD is the most extensive compilation of terrorism incidents, there are some gaps that 
arise while using the data. The first is that the data for 1993 is missing; this information was lost 
prior to START’s compilation from multiple collection efforts (GTD Codebook 2015). Another 
shortfall comes from differences in the collection of terrorism data between 1970-1997 and 
1998-present. Data from 1970-1997 was compiled by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service 
while post 1997 data is compiled by START. The GTD codebook notes “The GTD now includes 
incidents of terrorism from 1970 to 2014, however a number of new variables were added to the 
database beginning with the post-1997 data collection effort. Wherever possible, values for these 
new variables were retroactively coded for the original incidents, however some of the new 
variables pertain to details that were not recorded in the first phase of data collection.” (p. 4). 
Lastly, the data itself presents difficulties. The distinction between state and non-state actors is 
not always clear and autocratic governments with state-controlled media may suppress the 
reporting of terrorism incidents. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon with numerous variables 
influencing its occurrence, so what may be considered terrorism by some may be seen as a 
different act of political violence to others, making a clear and objective definition difficult to 
ascertain.  
 Data on refugee populations per capita and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) per capita 
comes from UNHCR. UNHCR’s statistics database contains bilateral information documenting 
country of residence/asylum, country of origin, and populations of concern from 1951-present. 
Using this data, I analyze the effects of refugee populations and IDPs on the number of terrorism 
incidents on countries of residence/asylum. UNHCR defines IDPs as “people or groups of 
individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in 
particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an international border.” Previous literature has shown IDPs can increase the number 
of terrorism incidents within a country. Choi and Piazza (2016) find “countries with larger 
internally-displaced populations are more prone to suicide terrorist attacks” and that this occurs 
“because internal displacement increases human rights abuses in countries, thereby fostering an 
environment in which the displaced are likely to turn to suicide terrorism to settle grievances.” 
(p. 1028). Therefore, I include internally displaced populations in my analysis. 
 Following Choi, Salehyan and Randahl, I include variables for democracy, autocracy, 
and “absent states” which include periods of anarchy, transition, or foreign intervention. I use the 
Polity IV dataset which codes values of democracy, autocracy, and absent states on a scale from 
-10 to 10. I create dummy variables for the political states, where 6 and greater is coded as 
democracy, -6 and less is coded as autocracy. I include an absent state dummy variable for 
observations coded as interruptions, interregnums/anarchy, and transitions. In addition to these 
variables, I use Choi and Salehyans’ failed state variable, a scale from 0 to 17 that uses the 
Political Instability Task Force dataset. The variable combines “the severity of ethnic wars (0-4), 
revolutionary wars (0-4), adverse regime changes (0-4), and genocides and politicides (0-5).” (p. 
58). Several studies have shown that both democracy and autocracy can have effects on 
lessening the number of terrorism incidents. Choi and Salehyan write “democracy is inversely 
related to terrorism since democracy provides peaceful channels of conflict resolution” (p. 58) 
while Randahl writes “autocratic governments are assumed to be able to use harsher methods to 
repress terrorist groups.” (p. 50) Choi and Salehyan also note that “previous studies find 
empirical support for the positive relationship between failed states and terrorism. Since the 
political leadership of failed states is too weak to exercise legal authority over much of its 
territory, it is bound to attract a variety of terrorist activity.” (p. 58). 
 Similar to Randahl’s research, I create dummy variables for conflict or war within a 
country or within a country sharing a land border using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP). UCDP defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle related deaths in a calendar year.” War is 
defined similarly with 1,000 deaths as the determining number. Conflict and war are likely to 
increase refugee populations, particularly in neighboring countries, and increase terrorism 
incidents. Randahl argues, including these variables “makes it possible to separate the effect that 
being involved in armed conflict has on terrorism compared to the effect that refugees 
themselves have on terrorism.” (p. 50). Randahl also notes these variables help control for the 
spill-over effects from neighboring countries experiencing wars. Previous literature has shown 
that refugees fleeing from neighboring countries may cause disruptions in host countries. For 
example, Choi and Salehyan note “the protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo was triggered by a large wave of migrants fleeing from violence and instability in 
Rwanda.” (pp. 53-54). 
 Logged Population data comes from the World Bank while logged GDP per capita was 
taken from the United Nations. These variables are logged to account for differences in 
population. It is likely that a smaller population will be affected by smaller numbers of refugee 
populations. A larger population makes it more difficult for the government of a country to 
provide security against terrorist attacks. Choi and Salehyan (2013) write “Since highly 
populated countries encounter more difficulty providing an adequate level of security to the 
entire population, they are at a greater risk of terrorist plots and attacks.” (p. 59). Regarding GDP 
per capita, Choi and Salehyan state “developed countries are more likely to experience terrorism 
since they are symbols of the political and economic status quo and because they provide more 
terrorist targets than less developed countries. Economic success attracts more terrorist attacks 
because economic inequality is assessed globally in the form of poor versus rich countries.” (p. 
59). Contrary to this argument, a higher GDP per capita may indicate more economic 
opportunities are available within the host country, and the population, including refugees, have 
more opportunities to prosper, thereby increasing the opportunity cost of committing terrorist 
acts. 
 I include the variable for military spending as a percentage of GDP to account for any 
counterterrorism efforts by host countries. Previous terrorism may influence governments’ 
decisions on spending to combat terrorism in the current year, therefore I lag this variable. 
Higher military expenditure allows for more government resources to be used for combating 
domestic and international terrorism. In countries experiencing conflict or war, higher military 
expenditure may lead to quicker resolutions of the conflicts/wars, allowing for a quicker return to 
stability. Alternatively, higher military spending may result in increased terrorism incidents, 
since rebel fighters may feel unable to fight using guerilla tactics, they may resort to terrorism as 
another form of fighting. The military expenditure data comes from the World Bank.  
 Lastly, I include a dummy variable for post 9/11 with the hypothesis that the September 
11th 2001 terrorist attacks resulted in increased attention towards terrorism, its origins, and how it 
can be combatted. With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. and 
similar departments around the world, along with the “War on Terror” efforts to combat 
terrorism have been revamped in the post 9/11 world. This in turn has had impacts on 
immigration, international development, and other areas of international relations. Azam and 
Thelen (2008) find post 9/11 aid “is used (among other things) as a means to induce local 
governments to fight terrorism within their sphere of influence and thus protect the political and 
economic interests of the donors.” (p. 30) while Cornelius (2005) notes legislation in 2004 that 
hires “2,000 additional Border Patrol agents each year for the next five years, nearly doubling the 
size of the Border Patrol. The stated rationale for this provision was that would-be terrorists may 
try to sneak into the country along with unauthorised labour migrants seeking entry along the 
US-Mexico border.” (pp. 789-790). This rationale, and similar policy initiatives have resulted in 
an increase in military spending. World Bank data notes, after the end of the Cold War, military 
spending decreased from a high of 3.42% of world GDP to a low of 2.18% in 2000. From 2000-
2009 military spending increased to 2.617% and has since trended downward. The military 
spending variable attempts to account for this shift in spending from post Cold War to post 9/11. 
Empirical Results 
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data variables mentioned in the previous 
section. Table 2 displays the results of the poisson regressions. Using terrorism incidents per 
capita as the dependent variable, Model 1, the model presented by Choi and Salehyan, indicates 
that as refugee population per capita within a host country increases, the number of terrorism 
incidents per capita increases. These results are significant at the 1% level. The results also show 
that as the severity of state failure, logged population, and lagged terrorism incidents increase, 
the number of terrorism incidents per capita increases. These results are significant at 1%. The 
post 9/11 variable shows a negative and significant relationship at the 10% level. Last, while not 
significant, the relationships between democracy and logged GDP per capita are negative. 
 Model 2, where casualties per capita replaces terrorism incidents per capita as the 
dependent variable, the poisson model shows that as refugees per capita within a host country 
increases, the number of casualties from terrorism incidents increases as well. This result is also 
significant at the 1% level. State failure and lagged terrorism remain positive and significant at 
the 1% level, while the logged population variable shows a positive relationship, significant at 
10%. In this model the democracy, logged GDP per capita and post-9/11 variables show negative 
relationships, however these results are not significant. 
 Adding regional variables (Model 3) for the percent of refugee population originating 
from a given region, results in refugee population per capita having a positive and significant 
relationship at the 5% level. State failure, logged population, and lagged terrorism are positive 
and significant at the 1% level while democracy and post-9/11 variables are negative and 
significant at 1%. Logged GDP per capita demonstrates a negative relationship, however this 
result is not significant. The regional variables show that increases in the percent of refugees 
originating from the Americas (North, Central, South America and the Caribbean) results in 
more terrorism incidents per capita. This relationship is significant at the 5% level. Increases in 
the percent of refugee populations originating from MENA, Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, 
and Europe and Central Asia result in fewer terrorism incidents per capita while increases in the 
percent of refugees from South Asia results in more terrorism incidents per capita. These results 
however are not significant. 
 Next I analyze the effects of the additional explanatory variables in Model 4. When IDP 
populations per capita, autocracy, war/conflict within the country and neighbor war/conflict, and 
military expenditure variables are added, the effect of refugee populations per capita remains 
significant although at the 5% level for this model. Internally displaced populations per capita 
demonstrate a positive and significant relationship at the 10% level. State failure, logged 
population, domestic war and conflict show positive and significant relationships at the 1% level 
while lagged terrorism and autocracy are positive and significant at the 10% and 5% levels 
respectively. Democracy, logged GDP per capita, neighboring war, and military spending show 
positive, although not significant relationships while neighboring conflict shows a negative and 
not significant relationship. 
 When the casualties per capita variable replaces terrorism incidents per capita, Model 5 
shows that the relationship between refugee populations per capita in a host country is significant 
at the 5% level and IDP population per capita shows a positive and significant relationship at the 
10% level. State failure, domestic war and conflict show positive and significant relationships at 
1%. Post-9/11 shows a negative and significant relationship at 5% while neighboring war shows 
a positive and significant relationship at 10%. Democracy, logged population, lagged terrorism, 
and autocracy all show positive relationships while logged GDP per capita, neighboring conflict, 
and military spending show negative relationships. However, these results are not significant. 
 When the additional explanatory variables and regional variables are added, Model 6’s 
results show that the relationship between refugee populations per capita and terrorism per capita 
are positive and significant at the 5% level. IDP populations per capita and terrorism per capita is 
also positive and significant at 5%. State failure, domestic war and conflict remain positive and 
significant at the 1% level and logged population and autocracy show positive relationships 
significant at 5% and 10% respectively. The post-9/11 variable shows a negative and significant 
relationship at the 1% level. Logged GDP per capita, lagged terrorism, neighboring war, and 
military spending show positive, although not significant relationships while democracy and 
neighboring conflict show negative and not significant relationships. The regional variables show 
that as the percentage of refugees originating from the Americas increases, the number of 
terrorism incidents per capita increases, significant at the 5% level. Although the results are not 
significant, the percentage of the refugee population from MENA and South Asia show positive 
relationships while Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia show negative 
relationships. 
 Table 3 shows the results for the OLS regressions using Randahl’s models. Following 
Randahl’s methods, next I use cross-national time-series OLS regressions to analyze the 
relationships. Similar to the paper’s results, Model 7 shows no significant relationship between 
refugees per capita and terrorism per capita within a host country. Lagged terrorism is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Both domestic and neighboring war and conflict, along with 
absent state and logged GDP per capita demonstrate positive relationships while democracy and 
autocracy show negative relationships. These results are not significant however. 
 Model 8 replaces terrorism incidents per capita with casualties per capita as the 
dependent variable and shows no significant relationship between refugee population per capita 
within a host country. The lagged terrorism variable shows a positive relationship significant at 
the 1% level while war variable is positive and significant at the 5% level. Conflict, Absent state, 
and logged GDP per capita show positive relationships and neighboring war, neighboring 
conflict, democracy, and autocracy show negative relationships. These results are not significant.  
 When the refugee per capita origin variables are added, Model 9 shows a positive, 
although not significant relationship between refugees per capita and terrorism per capita. 
Lagged terrorism remains positive and significant at the 1% level. Domestic and neighboring war 
and conflict, Absent state, and logged GDP per capita are positive although not significant. 
Democracy and autocracy are negative and not significant. The regional variables show that 
increases in the percentage of refugees originating from Africa results in a decrease in the 
number of terrorism incidents per capita. This relationship is significant at the 10% level. 
Refugee populations originating from MENA, Americas, South Asia, and Europe and Central 
Asia show positive relationships with terrorism incidents per capita while East Asia and the 
Pacific shows a negative relationship. 
 Model 10 adds additional explanatory variables and shows that refugees per capita and 
terrorism per capita have a positive relationship however the result is not significant. IDPs per 
capita demonstrate a positive and significant relationship at the 5% level. Lagged terrorism, state 
failure, and logged GDP per capita are positive and significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. The absent state and post-9/11 variables are negative and significant at 10% and 
1%. While the results are not significant, the relationships between terrorism per capita and 
conflict, neighboring war, autocracy, and military spending are positive while war, neighboring 
conflict, and democracy show negative relationships. 
 When casualties per capita replaces terrorism per capita as the dependent variable, Model 
11 shows, although positive, the relationships between refugees per capita, IDPs per capita, and 
terrorism per capita are not significant. Lagged terrorism and state failure variables are positive 
and significant at the 10% levels while the post-9/11 variable is negative and significant at 10%. 
War, conflict, neighboring conflict, absent state, and military spending are negative but not 
significant while neighboring war, democracy, autocracy, and logged GDP per capita are 
positive although not significant. 
 Adding the additional explanatory variables and regional variables, Model 12’s results 
show refugee populations per capita demonstrating a positive relationship with terrorism per 
capita, however these results are not significant. IDPs per capita however, demonstrates a 
positive and significant relationship at 5%.  Lagged terrorism and state failure remain positive 
and significant at the 1% level while post-9/11 and absent state show negative and significant 
relationships at the 10% levels. War, neighboring conflict, and democracy have negative 
relationships with terrorism per capita while conflict, neighboring war, autocracy, logged GDP 
per capita, and military spending are positive, although these results are not significant. The 
regional variables show that as the percentage of refugees originating from the Americas 
increases, the number of terrorism incidents per capita increases, significant at 5%. MENA, 
South Asia, and Europe and Central Asia show positive relationships while Africa and East Asia 
and the Pacific show negative relationships, however these results are not significant. 
Conclusion 
 This paper attempted to add to the existing academic literature analyzing the relationship 
between refugee populations within a host country and their effects on terrorism within these 
countries. With a few exceptions, the results mirror those found by previous studies. While any 
differences in results could be attributed to differences in time-frames, the results for this time-
frame show that the addition of the internally displaced population, autocracy, post-9/11, 
neighboring war or conflict, and military expenditure variables results in the refugee per capita 
variable remaining significant in Choi and Salehyans’ models and no significance in Randahl’s 
models. IDP populations prove to be a contributing variable towards terrorism incidents within a 
host country when the poisson regressions are used and show significance in several of the OLS 
models. Like refugee populations, there are several possible theories as to why IDP populations 
would increase terrorism. Similar to refugees, alienated IDPs, having been forced from their 
homes, may use terrorism against the responsible parties. Another possible explanation could be 
any terrorists within IDP populations would likely have established connections with extremist 
groups within the host country, allowing terrorist attacks to be carried out.  
 The poisson regression findings show, similar to Choi and Salehyans’ results, state 
failure, population, and lagged terrorism prove to be strong indicators for present terrorism per 
capita incidents. The addition of Randahl’s proposed domestic war and conflict variables also 
demonstrate significant relationships with terrorism incidents per capita. In countries 
experiencing state-failure, war, and/or conflict, terrorism may be a favorable tactic used by rebels 
to damage opposing forces. Contrary to Choi and Salehyans’ findings however, variables like 
democracy and logged GDP per capita show significant relationships in only a handful of 
models. The results also show that, while terrorism has been at the forefront of political 
discussions around the world since 9/11, the post-9/11 period shows a negative relationship with 
terrorism incidents per capita. This could be a result of shifting focus towards terrorism in the 
post-9/11 period and the “War on Terror” that occurred in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
Changes in foreign aid, support, and international coordination against terrorism may also be 
influencing factors. 
 Similar to Randahl’s findings, the cross-country time series OLS regressions show no 
significant relationship between refugees per capita and terrorism incidents per capita. IDPs per 
capita however show positive and significant relationships in several of the models. Like Choi 
and Salehyan, the state failure and lagged terrorism variables prove to be positive and significant 
with terrorism incidents per capita while also showing a negative relationship between the post-
9/11 period and terrorism incidents per capita. In both models, military spending shows no 
significance with terrorism incidents per capita. The addition of the regional variables, although 
demonstrating a few significant relationships, show little effect on the number of terrorism 
incidents per capita.  
While the findings of this paper may help describe the relationship between forced 
migration populations and terrorism, much more research is still needed in order to better 
understand the impact forced migrant populations have on host countries and the policies needed 
to ensure the safety of refugees and host country populations. Terrorism is a complex issue with 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
       
 count mean sd min max sum 
Total Terror 3416 18.80445 97.73559 0 2505 64236 
Casualties 3444 116.5064 768.635 0 21338 401248 
Refugee Pop. 3577 71114.21 220900.9 0 4150723 2.54e+08 
IDP Pop. 3607 51924.71 288936.1 0 6520800 1.87e+08 
Population 3608 3.78e+07 1.35e+08 194321 1.36e+09 1.36e+11 
GDP per Cap. 3576 9240.151 15099.05 80.44099 113686.4 3.30e+07 
Democracy 3541 .5156735 .4998249 0 1 1826 
Autocracy 3541 .1618187 .3683364 0 1 573 
Absent State 3608 .046286 .210133 0 1 167 
State Fail 3545 .5117066 1.470099 0 13.5 1814 
War 3608 .0451774 .2077218 0 1 163 
Conflict 3608 .1274945 .3335723 0 1 460 
Military Spend. 3129 2.321121 2.501224 0 39.60652 7262.787 







Table 2. Poisson Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









       
Refugees/Capt-1 18.98*** 27.88*** 15.89** 20.72** 33.79** 19.84** 
 (3.01) (2.82) (2.48) (2.16) (2.22) (2.07) 
Democracyt-1 -0.214 -0.263 -0.503*** 0.0385 0.262 -0.201 
 (-1.00) (-0.78) (-2.59) (0.23) (0.88) (-1.17) 
StateFailt-1 0.212*** 0.272*** 0.254*** 0.190*** 0.162*** 0.211*** 
 (4.52) (4.37) (4.77) (2.97) (3.66) (3.22) 
Ln GDP/Capt-1 -0.109 -0.260 -0.158 0.309 -0.104 0.141 
 (-0.42) (-1.18) (-0.69) (1.33) (-0.39) (0.48) 
Ln Popt-1 2.079*** 2.312* 3.916**** 1.630*** 0.731 3.052** 
 (2.99) (1.88) (3.52) (3.63) (0.58) (2.16) 
Post-9/11t-1 -0.357* -0.157 -0.483*** -0.719*** -0.624** -0.735*** 
 (-1.94) (-0.43) (-2.59) (-3.56) (-2.20) (-3.38) 
Terrorismt-1 0.00232*** 0.00176*** 0.00185*** 0.000748* 0.000132 0.000579 
 (6.42) (3.62) (6.20) (1.83) (0.29) (1.63) 
MENA Pct t-1   -0.00159   0.000163 
   (-0.23)   (0.02) 
Africa Pct t-1   -0.00750   -0.00563 
   (-0.95)   (-0.63) 
Americas Pct t-1   0.00787**   0.00604** 
   (2.39)   (2.12) 
EAsiaPacific Pct t-1   -0.0138   -0.00950 
   (-1.18)   (-0.82) 
SAsia Pct t-1   0.00118   0.00318 
   (0.15)   (0.36) 
EurCenAsia Pct t-1   -0.00475   -0.00330 
   (-0.63)   (-0.41) 
IDPs/Capt-1    2.936* 4.837* 3.464** 
    (1.95) (1.65) (2.31) 
Autocracyt-1    0.481** 0.455 0.572* 
    (1.96) (1.58) (1.83) 
Wart-1    0.721*** 0.819*** 0.653*** 
    (2.92) (3.54) (2.71) 
Conflictt-1    0.767*** 0.892*** 0.734*** 
    (3.71) (3.75) (3.63) 
NeighborWart-1    0.103 0.431* 0.0523 
    (0.59) (1.85) (0.27) 
NeighborConflictt-1    -0.181 -0.366 -0.0504 
    (-0.76) (-1.62) (-0.24) 
MilitarySpendt-1    0.0556 -0.00659 0.0442 
    (0.75) (-0.12) (0.66) 
N 2887 2792 2595 2528 2441 2310 
Wald Chi2 













t statistics in parentheses 













Table 3. OLS Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 









Refugees/Cap 0.0000181 0.000256 0.0000181 0.0000197 0.000263 0.0000190 
 (1.30) (1.30) (1.29) (1.31) (1.22) (1.25) 
Wart-1 0.00000124 0.0000151** 0.00000127 -0.000000569 -0.000000582 -0.000000507 
 (1.49) (2.41) (1.47) (-0.75) (-0.10) (-0.66) 
Conflictt-1 0.000000183 0.000000842 0.000000179 4.67e-08 -0.000000274 7.24e-08 
 (0.71) (0.29) (0.68) (0.24) (-0.13) (0.38) 
NeighborWart-1 4.80e-08 -0.00000202 4.67e-08 0.000000193 0.000000796 0.000000259 
 (0.21) (-1.03) (0.20) (0.89) (0.45) (1.13) 
NeighborConflictt-1 1.41e-08 -0.00000153 4.55e-08 -8.34e-08 -0.00000177 -6.87e-09 
 (0.11) (-1.33) (0.41) (-0.68) (-1.42) (-0.06) 
Democracy -0.000000419 -0.00000249 -0.000000510 -0.000000167 2.07e-08 -0.000000259 
 (-1.19) (-0.66) (-1.29) (-0.85) (0.01) (-1.27) 
Autocracy -0.000000754 -0.00000842 -0.000000579 0.000000131 0.00000222 0.000000221 
 (-1.60) (-1.08) (-1.12) (0.83) (0.74) (1.01) 
AbsentState 0.000000226 0.0000108 0.000000143 -0.000000855* -0.00000351 -0.000000987* 
 (0.41) (0.91) (0.21) (-1.79) (-0.52) (-1.68) 
Ln GDP/Cap 0.000000110 0.00000206 0.000000155 0.000000230* 0.00000184 0.000000185 
 (0.81) (1.38) (0.92) (1.84) (1.58) (1.49) 
Terrorismt-1 2.45e-08*** 0.000000170*** 2.41e-08*** 1.35e-08*** 3.52e-08* 1.33e-08*** 
 (3.41) (2.76) (3.27) (3.20) (1.90) (3.19) 
MENA Pct   8.22e-10   5.47e-09 
   (0.15)   (0.74) 
Africa Pct   -1.04e-08*   -7.06e-09 
   (-1.67)   (-1.01) 
Americas Pct   2.45e-09   3.45e-09** 
   (0.91)   (2.23) 
EAsiaPacific Pct   -2.84e-09   -1.50e-09 
   (-0.58)   (-0.33) 
SAsia Pct   1.23e-08   1.22e-08 
   (1.51)   (1.53) 
       
EurCenAsia Pct 1.85e-09 1.64e-09 
   (0.57)   (0.44) 
IDPs/Cap    0.00000652** 0.0000960 0.00000683** 
    (2.13) (1.31) (2.20) 
Post-9/11t-1    -0.000000254*** -0.00000204* -0.000000184* 
    (-2.75) (-1.90) (-1.82) 
MilitarySpendt-1    1.18e-08 -0.000000461 2.25e-09 
    (0.24) (-1.10) (0.05) 
StateFailt-1    0.000000236** 0.00000295* 0.000000249*** 
    (2.59) (1.96) (2.67) 
constant -0.000000399 -0.0000134 -0.000000558 -0.00000134 -0.0000108 -0.00000104 
 (-0.39) (-1.13) (-0.45) (-1.28) (-1.32) (-1.01) 
N 3022 3022 2713 2687 2687 2447 
R2 0.394 0.309 0.414 0.152 0.073 0.173 
t statistics in parentheses 


















































































































































































     
 
